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 The Economy-Wide Impacts of the 
Labour Intensification of Infrastructure 
Expenditure in South Africa 
Abstract 
This paper examines the performance of public works in addressing both micro 
and macroeconomic policy objectives relating to growth, employment and 
poverty reduction in South Africa.  The microeconomic analysis suggests that 
while participation in a public works programme may contribute to a reduction 
in the depth of poverty, with improvements in participation in education and 
nutrition, and have positive psychosocial benefits, the impact of a short-term 
programme may not be significant in terms of a reduction in headcount poverty 
or improvements in asset ownership (material or financial).  In this case the 
public works programme income may function essentially as a temporary wage 
shock, since the insurance function of the transfer is limited by the short 
duration of the employment period.   From a macroeconomic perspective, a 
social accounting matrix (SAM) is used to estimate the impact of shifting R3 
billion expenditure from machine to labour based infrastructure provision over 
a one year period.  The SAM indicates that the impact would be to increase 
employment by 1%, the income of the poorest quintile by 2% (if employment 
were exclusively targeted to this group) and GDP by 0.1%.  While these are 
positive outcomes, they are not significant in terms of South Africa’s overall 
economic and employment performance. The conclusion is drawn that from 
both a macro and microeconomic perspective, there is reason to be cautious 
about the potential of a national public works programme based on shifting the 
labour intensity of infrastructure provision, and offering short-term employment 
opportunities, to have a significant impact on poverty, employment or growth. 
1. Introduction 
This paper starts by outlining the nature of the labour market situation in South 
Africa, and characterising it as a chronic and structural problem.  Next the 
policy response is briefly reviewed, and the inconsistency between the accepted 
function of public works in the context of transitional labour market crises in   2
the international policy discourse, and the use of this instrument in the South 
African context, highlighted. 
This problem is investigated from both the micro and macro perspectives 
through the use of survey and technical programme data from a case study 
public works programme with similar characteristics to the proposed national 
public works programme. The programme is interrogated through the discussion 
of survey data analysis in order to gain microeconomic insights into the 
household level poverty and labour market impacts of programme 
participation
1, while a social accounting matrix (SAM) is used to model the 
anticipated macroeconomic impacts in terms of growth, income and demand for 
labour.  Finally the key findings from both analyses are reviewed and the 
implications for the attainment of policy objectives discussed. 
2. The Labour Market Context 
The South African labour market problem of high unemployment may be 
characterised as a chronic labour market crisis. After rising for three decades, 
unemployment reached a plateau in 2003 at extremely high levels, standing at 
31% (5.3 million) in March 2003, by the narrow definition, and 42% (8.4 
million) by the broad definition,
2  with unemployment concentrated in the 
African population, for whom the narrow unemployment rate was 37%, and the 
broad rate 49%, a labour market situation described by Kingdon and Knight in 
2000 as ‘catastrophic’ (2000:13).
3  These elevated levels of unemployment are 
the consequence of major structural shifts within the South African economy, 
arising from shifts in labour intensity and declining primary sector activity, 
which has had a major impact on both total employment levels and the 
composition of labour demand, leading to slow employment growth overall 
during the 1990s and early 2000s (McCord and Bhorat, 2003) and a significant 
decline in the demand for unskilled labour (Bhorat and Hodge, 1999). 
Economic growth rates are insufficient to absorb the growing pool of 
                                                       
1 For a full discussion of the survey findings see McCord 2004. 
2 The official or narrow rate of unemployment is calculated by Statistics South Africa (Stats 
SA) on the basis of those unemployed who a) did not work during the seven days prior to the 
interview, b) want to work and are available to start work within a week of the interview, and 
c) have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment in the 
four weeks prior to the interview, while the broad or expanded unemployment rate excludes 
criterion c). (Stats SA, 2002). 
3 However, recent research in South Africa indicates that self-employment, subsistence 
agriculture and casual employment may not always be considered as ‘work’ (see for example 
Adato et al., 1999). This may lead to a bias in survey-based estimates of unemployment.   3
unemployed labour, and even in the most positive growth scenario
4, it has been 
estimated that broad unemployment among the semi-skilled and unskilled 
would not fall significantly below 30% in the medium-term (Lewis, 2001). 
Unemployment is structural and will not be significantly reduced in the coming 
decades without major state intervention.
5 
The structure of unemployment in South African is directly influenced by 
colonial and apartheid manipulations of the labour market, the development of 
the migrant labour system, and related constraints on subsistence and informal 
sector activity (see for example Dieden 2003 for a discussion of some of the 
historical policy influences on the pattern of current unemployment, and Wilson 
1972 for a description of the South African migrant labour system). 
Unemployment then represents a sustained structural challenge, which will not 
be adequately addressed through conventional growth in GDP, as the current 
South African growth trajectory does not include a mass increase in the demand 
for low or unskilled labour (Lewis 2001).  The implication of these trends is the 
exclusion of growing numbers of the poor from engagement in the economy, 
hence there is an urgent need for active labour market and social protection 
interventions to attempt a reversal of this process of exclusion. 
3. The Policy Response 
In recognition of this challenge, the government has instituted a range of labour 
market initiatives since the early 1990s (for a full overview see  Streak and van 
der Westhuizen, 2004), which has included a variety of public works 
interventions, the most recent being the Expanded Public Works Programme 
(EPWP), launched in September 2004. The EPWP has received considerable 
attention in the popular discourse, and is perceived as a significant response to 
the chronic unemployment situation outlined above.  In the light of the policy 
prominence given to this public works based response to unemployment in 
South Africa (see McCord 2004), and the current preference for public works or 
‘workfare’ style programmes as a core tool for addressing unemployment in low 
and middle income countries, as evidenced by the emphasis on public works in 
the World Development Report 2001, and the centrality of public work 
responses to unemployment in donor funded social protection programmes 
                                                       
4 The positive growth scenario used by Lewis in this calculation was ten years with projected 
GDP growth of between 4% and 5% per annum. 
5 Abedian argues further that the more rapid the rate of economic growth, the more rapidly 
structural transformation of the economy will take place and demand for unskilled labour will 
fall (Abedian, 2004).   4
throughout Africa, this paper uses survey data and SAM analysis to explore the 
macro and micro-economic impacts of such an intervention.   
Within the labour market and social protection cannon, as exemplified by the 
2000/1 World Development Report, public work programmes (PWPs) are 
conventionally viewed as counter-cyclical labour market interventions, to be 
implemented in response to acute labour market crises or cyclical periods of 
unemployment, in situations of ‘[e]conomic crises and natural disasters, deep 
and sudden collapse in national output, and sharp increases in income poverty’ 
(World Bank, 2001).  PWPs are conceptualised as ‘a mix of risk mitigation and 
coping’ and such that ‘[p]roviding households with income following a crisis 
helps them avoid costly and damaging strategies (such as selling assets, 
reducing food intake)’.  At the core of this approach is the idea of assisting the 
poor to manage risk and the provision of insurance benefits through PWP 
employment, during a period of acute crisis.  Most of the current literature on 
PWPs assesses their performance in terms of mitigating the negative poverty 
and livelihoods impacts of such transient labour market shocks. 
Hence World Bank policy prescriptions include public works as a component of 
social protection (see the World Development Report 2001) as a short-term 
intervention, promoting survival through periods of acute and transient crisis, 
which may be natural or economic in nature.  It is widely agreed that sustained 
poverty reduction is largely contingent on the risk insurance function of the 
programme (Dev 1995, Devereux 2000, World Bank 2001), which in the most 
positive scenario may enable accumulation, and in the worst could prevent asset 
disinvestment.  This is feasible in the context of cyclical unemployment, by 
stimulating counter cyclical labour demand through public works, (for example 
in the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme) or in the context of short-
term, acute situations, arising from natural disasters or an economic crisis (for 
example Korea during the period of the Asian crisis) (ibid).    
The South African national public works programme, the Expanded Public 
Works Programme (EPWP) is constructed similarly, offering short-term 
employment on the basis of the characterisation of unemployment as a 
transitional phenomenon; 
‘The EPWP is one of an array of government strategies aimed at 
addressing unemployment. The fundamental strategies are to increase 
economic growth so that the number of net new jobs being created 
starts to exceed the number of new entrants into the labour market, 
and to improve the education system such that the workforce is able 
to take up the largely skilled work opportunities which economic   5
growth will generate.  In the meantime, there is a need to put in place 
short to medium-term strategies. The EPWP forms one of 
government’s short to medium-term strategies.’ [italics added] 
(Department of Public Works, 2003). 
It is argued that PWPs are required as a transitional short- to medium-term 
strategy, pending increased labour demand as a result of economic growth, and 
by implication that participation in the PWP will enhance labour quality such 
that it will be able to access the future skilled work opportunities arising from 
economic growth.  In line with this analysis, the proposed EPWP is similar to 
the PWP concept outlined in the 2001 WDR, representing a response to 
transient, acute unemployment.  However, in the context of sustained 
unemployment which is chronic and mass, rather than cyclical or acute, it is not 
apparent that this prescription is appropriate.  Given the structural nature of the 
South African unemployment problem outlined above, and the acute 
characteristics of the policy response, which is most frequently used in 
situations of transient employment crisis, the paper raises the question of a 
possible mismatch between the nature of the labour market problem, and the 
characteristics of the policy response.  Given this asymmetry between the 
chronic problem and the acute response, the international literature suggests that 
the public works concept adopted in South Africa is unlikely, by virtue of its 
design, to have a significant impact on poverty, unemployment or by extension, 
growth.  Both recent survey data and a SAM model of the South African 
economy are interrogated in this paper in order to ascertain whether this concern 
regarding a mismatch between the problem and the policy response is valid.   
4. Methodology 
This paper draws on survey and budget data from the Gundo Lashu Public 
Works programme in the Limpopo province.   The programme has been chosen 
as it has similar characteristics to the national EPWP launched in September 
2004, for which it is a model.  Both programmes use the terms and conditions 
set out in the Special Public Works Programme Code of Good Conduct to 
govern targeting, remuneration and employment, (Department of Labour 2002a 
and 2002b) and so data from this programme is likely to offer insights into the 
probable performance of the EPWP.  The microeconomic analysis is based on a 
random one stage survey administered to 263 households with either current or 
former PWP employees, drawn from two clusters within the District of 
Capricorn (Mankweng and Sekhukhune), while the SAM draws on budgetary 
information derived from the same programme. In both cases the data was 
gathered in collaboration with the Limpopo Roads Authority.   6
While there is an extensive literature on the impact of infrastructure on 
development, (see for example Gannon and Liu, 1997), and the impact of 
infrastructure on income distribution (Calderon and Chong, 2004), the macro 
analysis abstracts out the impact of infrastructure created through the PWP, 
excluding any modelling of the impact of the infrastructure itself.  The reason 
for this exclusion is that under the provisions of the national EPWP, new funds 
are not being allocated to infrastructure provision, rather the factor intensity of 
existing budgetary allocations is being shifted.  The infrastructure produced 
through the EPWP would have been constructed in the absence of the EPWP, 
but using capital rather than labour intensive methods.  Hence the impact of the 
EPWP is exclusively the impact of shifting the factor intensity of the production 
of any given asset. 
5. The Gundo Lashu Programme and EPWP 
The goal of the Gundo Lashu programme is the ‘improvement of livelihoods in 
rural communities in the Northern Province’, and the purpose ‘employment 
creation within the rural communities… skill transfer from private contractors 
to community members… [and] enhancement of livelihoods for those 
community members providing labour to the programme’ (Roads Authority 
Limpopo, 2003).  The programme is implemented by the Roads Authority 
Limpopo,
6 with support from DFID and the ILO, and is focused on both 
employment creation, and the training of contractors and consultants in labour 
intensive road rehabilitation.  The programme was initiated in 2000, and had 
employed a total of 1,700 labourers at the time of the survey in mid 2003.  The 
programme was implemented through contractors who directly recruited PWP 
workers who were employed for between one and four months, and workers 
were recruited on the basis of the Special Public Works Programme targeting 
objectives and conditions of employment.
7   Remuneration was set at a task rate 
of R30, which in most cases translated into a daily wage of R30.  Wage 
payments were made directly in cash to workers by the contractors, and training 
inputs delivered by the Department of Labour.
8   
                                                       
6 The Roads Authority Limpopo is a parastatal with responsibility for the management of all 
provincial level roads. 
7 The Special Public Works Programme Code of Conduct, gazetted in 2001, sets out targets 
of 60% women, 20% youth and 2% disabled, prohibits employment exceeding 24 months in 
duration, and also allows for a derogation from the minimum wage in favour of a locally 
negotiated wage, in return for training inputs for workers for 2 days for every 20 worked. 
8 It should be noted that the training package offered to the Gundo Lashu workers was 
recognised as sub-optimal, and has subsequently been revised.    7
The EPWP, was launched in September 2004 and has been ascribed a range of 
objectives centering on infrastructure provision, poverty reduction, employment 
and growth (Department of Public Works 2003).  It is based on shifting the 
factor intensity of R3 billion
9 infrastructure expenditure per annum throughout a 
five-year period, and is complemented by the development of short-term labour 
absorbing initiatives in the social and economic spheres (ibid).  The programme 
is described as ‘a nation-wide programme which will draw significant numbers 
of the unemployed into productive work, so that workers gain skills while they 
work, and increase their capacity to earn an income once they leave the 
programme’ through the utilisation of public sector budgets to ‘reduce and 
alleviate unemployment’ (ibid).  The programme aims to create 200,000 short-
term employment opportunities each year, and in the popular political discourse, 
is anticipated to deliver significant benefits to the economy at both micro and 
macro levels, in terms of poverty, employment and growth.   Each of these 
aspirations is examined in the following sections, drawing on data from the 
Gundo Lashu programme outlined above. 
6. The Micro impact of Public Works 
Participation  
Survey data from the Gundo Lashu programme is used to assess the 
microeconomic impact of public works programme participation in terms of 
selected indicators of poverty, taking into account both income and non-income 
dimensions of poverty, and labour market performance.
10   
6.1 The Impact on Income Poverty 
First the level of the PWP wage and its likely impact on ‘self-targeting’ to the 
poorest is reviewed, and then the impact of PWP participation on household 
income is calculated and income poverty examined.   
The mean monthly PWP wage is R579, and for 93% of workers, no additional 
income from other sources was reported. By comparing the PWP wage to the 
mean income for working household members and the mean income for formal 
and informal sector workers and elementary workers from the 2003 LFS for 
                                                       
9 R3 billion is approximately US$500 million at September 2004 exchange rates. 
10 For a full analysis of the survey findings, see McCord 2004.   8
non-urban Limpopo, the PWP wage may be seen in the context of the wage 
distribution in the province
11, see table 1 below.  
Table 1: Monthly PWP incomes with provincial comparators, 2003 
Kind of work  Mean  Range 
Public Works  579  200-1000 
Regular wage labour  774  200-2640 
Casual wage labour  612  100-3960 
Subsistence agriculture  218  36-400 
Non-farm enterprises  446  40-1320 
Formal sector (LFS)  1618  30-9000 
Informal sector (LFS)  385  6-9000 
Elementary workers (LFS)  549  6-5000 
The PWP wage is less than both the casual and regular labour income wages but 
higher than income earned from subsistence agriculture and non-farm 
enterprises.  While it is above the informal sector mean, it falls below the formal 
sector mean, conforming closely with the mean elementary wage
12.   The fact 
that the public works wage falls above mean monthly wages in the informal 
sector, the elementary sector, subsistence agriculture and non farm enterprise 
implies that this is likely to compromise the effectiveness of the wage as the 
primary instrument for targeting access to employment, in terms of the ‘self 
selection’ of the poorest, and risks drawing workers from alternative informal 
sector employment, rather than attracting only those without alternative access 
to income.  This is problematic if targeting the poor
13 is an objective of the 
programme, as the poor are less likely to succeed in accessing employment 
under these conditions, than those with superior socio-economic status and 
social capital.  This problem is compounded if the ‘effective’ value of the public 
works wage is taken into consideration, since PWP task-based employment is 
                                                       
11 PWP workers may be compared to elementary workers in terms of their skill levels. 
12 According to the LFS in non-urban Limpopo, of those who specified the nature of their 
employment, 59% were in the formal sector, and 31% the informal sector. 
13 The concept of targeting ‘the poor’ is itself problematic in the case of South Africa, where 
approximately 40-50% of the population are estimated to be poor and up to 8 million are 
unemployed (Stats SA 2003c).  Clearly there is a need to disaggregate ‘the poor’ and target 
the programme using alternative criteria relating to depth of poverty.  Moreover, the national 
public works programme will offer employment to a maximum of 200,000 people per annum; 
the implications in terms of the difficulty of oversubscription are immediately apparent. For a 
discussion of this issue, see McCord 2004.   9
designed to demand an average of only five hours of labour per day
14.  The 
limited work hours of the programme renders the effective wage higher in 
comparison to prevailing wages, and further undermines the self targeting 
impact of the programme on the basis of the principle of ‘less eligibility’.
15  It 
should be noted, however, that the wage levels for some forms of employment 
reported by workers were as low as R6 a day, and so the issue of attracting 
labour out of prior employment into PWP employment should not de facto be 
considered undesirable.  
In order to assess the wage impact of participation in a PWP, wage foregone 
must be taken into account. This represents a directly measurable opportunity 
cost for programme participation, which is important when considering the net 
labour market and income impact of public works.  33% of the workers 
surveyed gave up other work in order to participate in the programme, 
indicating significant labour market substitution occurring as the result of the 
programme.  Focus group discussion indicated however that this is related to the 
extremely low wage levels prevailing in the area, in both the local informal 
sector, and the informalised component of the agricultural sector
16 and the 
relative ease within which workers can move in and out of low paid informal 
sector work.  Focus group discussions revealed that work available in the area 
tended to be sporadic and difficult to predict, varying in terms of availability 
and duration of employment, as well as remuneration and certainty of being 
paid for work performed
17.  In the light of this, the regular and certain 
employment offered by the PWP was considered superior to the more uncertain 
and discontinuous employment otherwise available, rendering the decision to 
forego alternative income a rational one.  For the PWP workers reporting no 
income foregone, the net income gain was R579, compared to R270 for the 33% 
who reported foregone earnings.   
                                                       
14 International evidence suggests that 5 hours output of a motivated worker paid on a task 
basis results in as high output as, or higher output than, 8 hours of a less well-motivated 
worker paid on a daily basis.  This is one of the key principles behind the use of task-based 
payment systems. 
15 Under the principle of ‘less eligibility’, remuneration for public works employment should 
be lower than the alternatives available in the market, in order to ensure that public works 
employment is only accessed by the poorest, without access to market alternatives.   
Unfortunately, given the low levels of the prevailing wage in some areas, adherence to this 
principle may have negative moral and humanitarian implications (see Chirwa et al 2004). 
16 The introduction of the minimum wage in agriculture was perceived as having little impact 
on the highly casualised lower end of the agricultural sector, in which workers are recruited 
and paid daily on a task basis, with no employment registration or documentation of their 
employment, wage in this sector were reported to be as low as R6 per day.  
17 The difficulty in ensuring payment for informal work carried out within the community 
was raised as a concern among some of the PWP workers.   10
6.2 The Impact on Poverty Reduction  
Once PWP income and income foregone have been calculated, total household 
income can be reviewed in relation to the poverty line, in order to assess the 
contribution of PWP income to reducing poverty.  Several poverty lines are in 
use in South Africa, offering differing estimates of the proportion of the 
population living in poverty. For this analysis, a per capita Household 
Subsistence Line (HSL) of R486 has been selected following Meth 2004
18.  This 
measures the theoretical monthly cost of basic needs derived from a basket of 
goods and services, comprising food, housing, fuel, light and transport.   
When adjusted per capita income was calculated for members of the PWP 
households
19, it was found that notwithstanding the relatively generous effective 
wage offered in the PWP, 87% household members with public works 
employees fell below the per capita HSL of R486 with a mean per capita rand 
shortfall of R227 per capita per month.  In the households with former rather 
than current PWP employees, 96% of household members fell below the HSL 
poverty line, with a mean shortfall of R322.  If the two groups are considered to 
broadly represent the same population sample, this suggests that a high 
percentage of households were below the poverty line prior to PWP 
employment, and that the headcount poverty rate is reduced as a result of the 
PWP income.   
Even with public works income, 87% of participating households still fell below 
the poverty line by a significant margin.  These findings indicate that public 
works employment does not move the majority of participating households out 
of poverty.  However, since for all participants the PWP income represented an 
increase in household income, it is possible to conclude that PWP participation 
has reduced the poverty gap, and hence reduced the intensity of poverty 
experienced by workers’ households.  The fact that the PWP has not moved the 
majority of participants out of poverty, indicates that offering lower wage rates 
would further compromise the income poverty impact of the programme.     
                                                       
18 This figure is derived from Potgeiter (2003), and was developed for urban households.  
However, given the lack of a rural HSL for South Africa, it will be used as an approximate 
indicator of household poverty.   
19 Following Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001: 54).   11
6.3 The Impact on Other Dimensions of Poverty 
The survey data indicates that the impact of PWP participation on headcount 
poverty is limited, but that it does have an impact on reducing the depth of 
poverty.  By exploring the impact of participation on non-income dimensions of 
poverty, it is possible to investigate the experiential meaning of this reduction in 
the depth of poverty. In this section, the impact on asset ownership, human 
capital and psychosocial ‘functionings’
20 as indicators of non-income 
dimensions of poverty, are explored.  
The ownership of financial assets (formal or informal savings, insurances etc) 
and material assets (cooking implements, furniture etc) was reported to increase 
in 25% of households with current public works employment.  However, 70% 
reported no change, with the PWP income having been directly consumed
21.  
Only 18% of households in which PWP employment had already been 
completed reported a sustained benefit in terms of an improvement of financial 
assets after the period of PWP employment.  This suggests that the impact on 
reducing future vulnerability (by increasing the asset base of workers) was 
limited, and closely associated with the period during which employment was 
experienced.  The international literature suggests that the accumulation of 
assets is linked to the duration of the employment period, as a short period of 
income receipt does not tend to have a significant impact on savings or 
investment in assets, but rather is directly consumed (Devereux 2000).  
This is confirmed by the fact that for 79% of Gundo Lashu households, the 
main use of additional income earned through PWP employment was food (for 
13% of households the main expenditure item was clothing, and for 4% it was 
education).  
In terms of human capital, as illustrated by school participation and nutrition, 
the impact of PWP participation was found to be marginal.  The impact on 
school participation was explored through recall questions
22, and found not to 
                                                       
20 Following Sen’s concept of functionings, see for example Sen (1993: 30-54).  
21 5% reported a decrease in ownership of financial assets over the period of PWP 
employment. 
22 The use of recall questions was necessitated by the lack of baseline data gathered on 
participating households.  A difference-in-difference methodology would have been the most 
appropriate form of evaluating the impact, using as a control households with similar pre-
programme characteristics to those of the households subsequently ‘treated’ by becoming 
PWP participants.  However this approach was not feasible due to the fact that the 
characteristics of PWP participants were not known a priori, rendering the inclusion of a 
non-treatment control group in the survey impossible; the identification of the characteristics   12
be significant, as 95% of children in the surveyed households attended school 
regularly even prior to participation in the programme. PWP employment 
however did have an impact on nutrition within the household, in terms of the 
incidence of adults skipping meals, not eating for a whole day, and the 
reduction of food given to children due to lack of cash.  While responses to all 
three questions indicated a positive correlation between improved household 
nutrition and PWP participation, these impacts were of limited significance due 
to the relatively low incidence of these problems even prior to programme 
participation
23.   Survey data gathered in parallel with the Gundo Lashu survey, 
on a PWP in which extremely poor households were explicitly targeted using 
poverty as the main criterion for programme participation
24 (as opposed to a 
combination of poverty, age, gender and disability status as in the Special 
Public Works Programmes conditions governing the Gundo Lashu programme 
and the EPWP), did find significant changes in both participation in schooling, 
and nutrition, despite a monthly wage of R334, compared to R650 in the Gundo 
Lashu programme.  This was found to be related to the significantly greater 
depth of poverty of those participating in this programme, and the lower ex ante 
investment in human capital among the worker’s households, ie the programme 
had a greater impact, despite the lower value of the transfer, since it was 
targeted at a poorer population group.   
Focus groups revealed that both programmes however had significant 
psychosocial impacts, in terms of improving the quality of the participation of 
workers and their households in community activities, facilitating membership 
of burial societies, enabling participants to shift from the position of mendicants 
to donors within the community, and reducing the shame experienced as a result 
of wearing dirty and worn clothing.  In this sense programme participation 
contributed directly to improved ‘functionings’.  
6.4 Poverty Conclusion 
Despite the continued high levels of income poverty, with the majority of PWP 
participants remaining below the poverty line regardless of their participation in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of participants itself formed one of the critical questions which the study set out to examine, 
see McCord (2004). 
23 As a result of participation in the programme the percentage of households with adults 
never skipping meals rose from 55% to 75%, the percentage of households where adults 
never went without food for a whole day rose from 65% to 79%, and the percentage of 
households reporting never reducing the size of children’s meals rose from 63% to 80%.   
24 This parallel study was carried out on the Zibambele programme, implemented by the 
Department of Transport in KwaZulu Natal, see McCord (2004) for a comparative analysis.   13
the programme, in all cases positive impacts on various dimensions of poverty 
were noted as a consequence of participation in the programme.  However these 
benefits were marginal for most households, and the survey indicated that 
benefits accrued under the programme may not be sustained beyond the end of 
the employment period.  Among households who had completed their period of 
public works employment, only 33% stated that participation in the programme 
would lead to a sustained reduction of poverty, while 67% believed that the 
benefits accruing from PWP employment would be of only temporary duration. 
Two issues emerge from the discussion of the impacts of public works 
programmes above; i) the anti poverty impacts of public works programmes 
may be marginal
25 and ii) the duration of poverty reducing benefits arising from 
PWP employment may only be sustained as long as the wage transfer is taking 
place.  This represents a critical insight into the limitations of short-term public 
works employment as an instrument of social protection, and confirms that the 
selection of short-term PWPs as the policy option of choice to address these 
issues in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment may be problematic.  
This is particularly true if the findings of Devereux (2000) and Dev (1995) 
regarding the critical role of PWPs in terms of their risk function is taken into 
consideration, since this would suggest that  a short-term transfer in the context 
of a chronic labour market crisis, would be unlikely to have a sustained risk 
function impact, and that consequently the sustained anti-poverty impact would 
be likely to be limited, with the transfer likely to serve simply as a positive 
wage shock. 
6.5 The Impact on the Labour Market 
In addition to the direct poverty relief function of receipt of the PWP wage, 
work experience and training is seen as one of the key benefits of participation 
in a public works programme within the EPWP in terms of improved labour 
market performance as a consequence of improved quality of labour supply
26.  
In focus groups, workers stated that the experience of working on the PWP and 
the skills gained through participation did not significantly enhance their 
                                                       
25 Survey evidence also suggests however that if a programme is targeted to a poorer 
subsection of the population, the impacts may be less marginal, and of greater significance 
(see McCord 2004). 
26 An example of this is the conceptualisation of the EPWP as a ‘work experience and 
training period’, at the end of which workers graduate to employment under ‘normal 
conditions’.  Post PWP employment options are characterised as ‘moving to a new employer, 
further education, better equipped job seeking, remaining with the same employer under 
normal employment conditions, or self employment’ (Department of Public Works, 2004).    14
employment prospects, due to the high unemployment rates and lack of demand 
for labour with the skills gained during participation in the PWP.  This 
corroborates the survey finding that former PWP workers had no significantly 
greater chance of working than other household members, with similar levels of 
former PWP employees working at the time of the interview as households’ 
members without PWP employment experience, with figures of 17% and 19% 
respectively
27.   The broad unemployment rate among former PWP workers is 
stark, with 80% of former employees unemployed.  This may be compared to 
rates of 72% among non-Gundo Lashu workers, and a mean rate of 60% among 
the non urban Limpopo population (Stats SA 2003a).  This suggests that being 
employed in a PWP did not have a significant beneficial impact on the 
subsequent employment performance of workers
28.  While it is important, to 
bear in mind that there may be a lag between completing public works 
employment and finding alternative employment, it is also true that experience 
and skills become less valuable as the duration of unemployment increases.   
The data confirms however the fact that the unemployment rate among former 
PWP employees is at least as high as among non PWP workers in the survey, 
which challenges the assumption that PWP participation has a significant 
beneficial impact on subsequent employment performance, at least in the short-
term.  This also challenges the assumption underlying public works which 
suggests that participation in a PWP is a ‘stepping stone’ to employment in the 
open labour market (Department of Public Works, 2004).   
                                                       
27 It is possible that the two groups have different labour market characteristics, and hence a 
direct comparison between the two may not be instructive.  This is an area for further analysis 
of the survey findings.  It is however clear that at 17%, the absolute level of work among 
former PWP workers, is low. 
28 The unemployment rates in non-urban Limpopo are 39.6% (narrow) and 59.7% (broad) 
(Stats SA 2003c).  This compares to a broad unemployment rate among all Gundo Lashu 
household members, including current PWP workers of 56.1%.  As would be anticipated 
given the inclusion of PWP employment into these households, this is below the prevailing 
broad unemployment rate of 59.7%.  A rate of 71.6% is found if PWP employees are 
excluded.  It could be argued that this reflects a high unemployment rate among the selected 
group of PWP participant households in general, or may be indicative of the fact that those 
who enter PWP employment may be among the more ‘employable’ members of the 
household, in terms of characteristics such as age, physical strength, health etc, given the 
degree of employment substitution revealed by the survey, and that consequently the 
unemployment rate among the non participants, who may be ‘unemployable’ (those who are 
'never going to find sustainable, long-term employment in their lifetimes' by virtue of their 
lack of skills and the remoteness of their rural location in relation to labour demand (Bhorat 
2001; 40)) may be higher.  However this interpretation is challenged by the extremely high 
unemployment rate prevailing among the former PWP employees, 79.8%, which exceeds that 
of the non PWP participants.     15
6.5.1 Training and employment performance 
While 38% of PWP workers reported that they had received some training, 
either in entrepreneurship, technical road maintenance/construction, supervision 
or life skills, the majority reported no training in technical skill areas.  Only 6% 
of former workers thought that the training they had received had enabled them 
to find additional wage employment, with the main reasons that training had not 
enabled them to find employment being lack of employment opportunities 
(61%), followed by lack of resources for job search (29%).  The kind of skills 
gained by workers through participation in a construction based PWP were not 
the skills for which a significant unmet labour demand is apparent.  On the 
contrary, such PWPs promote labour skilled in a sector which is stagnant or 
contracting
29. 
6.5.2 The Generation of Self Employment  
58% of workers stated that they would like to set up as contractors, but lack of 
finance and skills were cited as the main deterrents.  Given the lack of 
availability of both capital and skills training in contractor development (as 
opposed to basic skills) for the workers, programme participation alone is 
unlikely to enhance their labour market performance. These findings challenge 
the assumption of current policy that workplace participation sui generis will 
promote the development of SMMEs in the construction sector or elsewhere.  
Likewise the development of micro-enterprise activity as the result of increased 
availability of cash at local level was found to be limited, with only 14% of 
households using PWP income to set up or expand small business enterprises.  
The income generating activities which were initiated were primarily small 
scale trading (54%) and service provision (30%).  For all households the main 
factor preventing the development of micro enterprise was lack of credit/capital, 
which was highlighted by over 80% of respondents.  This is consistent with 
findings by Devereux (2000), who argued that the poor use incremental income 
to satisfy basic consumption needs first, then invest in human capital (education 
and health) and social capital, and only then invest in income generating 
activities and seeds
30.  In this way the public works wage would only impact on 
                                                       
29 The construction sector has either been declining or stagnant since 1996 (McCord and 
Bhorat 2003). 
30 Devereux stated that ‘high value transfers are associated with higher propensities to invest 
in agriculture, social capital, (including in financial assistance to relatives), education and 
acquisition of productive assets’ (2000: 4), while low value transfers by contrast, are mainly 
consumed, in the form of food and clothes.     16
productive investment if it were large enough to cover consumption needs, or 
sufficiently sustained to enable accumulation.  On the basis of this analysis a 
prolonged period of employment, higher wage level and/or additional 
institutional supports (micro finance, appropriate micro-enterprise training etc) 
may be required if the policy goal of stimulating household income generating 
activity is to be achieved.
31   
6.6 The Impact on the Local Economy  
The survey indicated that 67% of workers purchased most of their food from 
local shops, indicating that resources were flowing into the local economy.   
However, focus group discussions revealed that the local micro-enterprises 
which sprang up around the work teams ceased trading once the period of 
employment was completed.  The other vector through which PWPs had the 
potential to stimulate the local economy is economic benefits accruing from the 
asset created (see for example Gannon & Liu, 1997).  However, this impact is 
contingent on two external factors, i) the strategic value of the asset created for 
the community as a whole, and for different members of the community, and ii) 
the quality and durability of the asset.  These factors are related to the asset 
selection processes and the management of asset production, which are reliant 
on local government performance, and the quality of district Integrated 
Development Plans.  The survey findings did not provide evidence that the 
construction of the roads had brought economic benefits, and did not assess the 
strategic value of the roads, although the potential for disappointment in terms 
of the actual, rather than anticipated benefits of road construction is highlighted 
in Mashiri and Mahapa (2002), and it may not be assumed the infrastructure 
construction will per se engender a significant economic benefit for the local 
economy. 
6.7 Labour Market Summary 
From the survey data it is clear that there is not a significant improvement in 
labour market performance among PWP workers in the immediate aftermath of 
programme participation, primarily due to the overwhelming lack of demand for 
labour, even if the quality of labour has been enhanced though PWP experience.  
The anticipated supply side benefits resulting from increased experience and 
skills are not able to function in the context of massively constrained demand.  
                                                       
31 It should be noted that in the absence of a sustained period of PWP employment, micro 
finance inputs would not be likely to have a significant impact.   17
Equally, the impact on informal employment and income generation activity is 
limited by lack of capital, skills and market demand, which could only be 
addressed by complimentary social development initiatives (microfinance, 
income generation etc) which could increase the likelihood of the wage transfer 
having longer term impacts.  Without such complimentary inputs, the limited 
value of the transfer and duration of employment, make investment in 
productive assets which could be used in the informal economy unlikely. 
7. The Macroeconomic Impact  
Having identified the likely microeconomic impacts of a PWP designed in 
accordance with the specifications of the EPWP through the analysis of survey 
data, the macroeconomic impacts of the EPWP were modelled using a social 
accounting matrix (SAM) of the South African economy to see if there was a 
consistency between the macro and microeconomic findings.  The impacts 
identified at micro level above suggest that the macroeconomic impacts would 
be limited, in line with the theoretical critique of the implementation of a short-
term policy response to a chronic labour market problem.   
The economy-wide impact of shifting from machine to labour based 
infrastructure provision was modelled using data from the Gundo Lashu 
programme in a first generation SAM based model for South Africa
32, and 
compared to the data for the provision of the same infrastructure using 
conventional methods
33.  The model illustrates the potential GDP, labour market 
and household income distribution effects under each scenario, and this impact 
of shifting to labour based production is assessed by comparing the situation 
under the two scenarios.  In doing so this model takes rural gravel road 
rehabilitation as a proxy for infrastructure provision in general, as typical of the 
kind of activity implemented under a labour based public works programme
34. 
In order to conduct an economy-wide impact analysis, an expenditure profile 
was created for each of the two options reflecting the nature of each option as 
precisely as possible, one reflecting a machine based (capital intensive) option, 
and the other a labour based one.  The model was run using a budget of R3 
                                                       
32 The social accounting matrix (SAM) for the South African economy is representative of 
the year 2000. 
33 This section draws on data provided by IT Transport.  For a full discussion of this data see 
Taylor, McCord and van Seventer, forthcoming.  
34 The cost of infrastructure provision has been estimated to be similar using either method 
(Taylor et al, forthcoming).   18
billion which is equal to the planned shift in annual expenditure from capital to 
labour intensive infrastructure production under the national EPWP. 
7.1 The model 
The impact of shifting factor intensity in the production of infrastructure is 
modelled using a representation of the South African economy which assumes 
that the structure of the economy is fixed. This is not a serious problem in this 
kind of application  since the small scale of a R3 billion public works 
programme is unlikely to effect the basic structure of a R1,200 billion economy 
(in 2003 prices). 
The structure of this economy is captured by a social SAM
35, which represents 
conventional national accounting practices with sectoral, factor market, 
household and other detail added in an internally consistent manner. The SAM 
identifies 43 industries (and their associated primary products), 3 labour 
categories and 14 household income classes. Labour income earned by each 
labour category feeds into a set of household income classes in addition to 
income derived from capital and other sources such as transfers as part of fixed 
household income distribution mapping. 
This SAM is the underlying data base for a simple fixed coefficient model 
which can be presented as the following single linear algebraic equation: 
Eqn 1      X = AX + F = (I – A)
-1 * F 
In which X is a column vector of endogenous variables, including industry 
output, demand for commodities, factor income and institutional income of 
aggregate enterprises as well as disaggregated households, F a column vector of 
exogenous variables including the commodity demand by government, 
aggregate investment demand and exports, I an identity matrix of appropriate 
size and A a matrix of coefficients describing the interrelationships amongst the 
endogenous variables in per unit terms
36.  
                                                       
35 This SAM is updated by Thurlow (2003) from an earlier SAM (with full description) for 
the year 1998 by Thurlow & van Seventer (2002).  The dimensions of the SAM that is used 
for our purposes are shown in Appendix A. 
36 Endogenous variables include amongst others; Supply of commodities (each commodity 
can be produced by more than one industry, each industry can produce more than one 
commodity (primary and secondary)), Intermediate inputs (each industry uses a range of   19
Eqn 2      ∆X = (I – A)
-1 * ∆F 
Given the identity of Eqn 1, a model can be set up which allows for the impact 
of a change in final demand ∆F to be evaluated in terms of a change in the 
endogenous variables, ∆X. The challenge of our modelling exercise is to 
represent the EPWP in terms of the vector of the change in final demand ∆F. 
A number of auxiliary variables can be derived from the change in the 
endogenous variables, ∆X, including imports, government revenue and also 
employment, as it is often assumed that for all sectors that will indirectly 
receive a boost as a result of a stimulus such as the EPWP, the average 
employment - output ratios of the relevant industries apply.  However evidence 
exists of economies of scale in the use of labour, especially when it involves the 
marginal expansion of output in a sector, which implies that a rise in output is 
absorbed by more efficient use of existing labour, or overtime. To capture these 
dynamics, the computation of indirect (upstream or knock-on) employment is 
selectively based on economy-wide long-term econometric estimates of non-
linear employment-output elasticities estimated by Moolman (2002).  
Most labour employed as a consequence of a public works programme would 
typically be from the unskilled category with some from higher skilled labour 
for management.  The economy-wide income distribution patterns embedded in 
the underlying SAM data base mean that unskilled labour income would not 
only accrue to very poor households. For purposes of modelling the EPWP, an 
additional labour category ‘public works labour’ was added to the SAM, which 
maps all public works income to the poorest two deciles
37.   
In this model the production structures of the economy are assumed to remain 
constant following the modelled stimulus, meaning that the SAM analysis is 
comparative static and ignores any dynamic effects, including substitution 
between the production factors labour and capital and between domestically and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
commodities as intermediate input), factor incomes paid by industries, distribution of income 
to institutions, indirect taxes and trade and transport margins. 
37 This allocation of public works income most closely represents the ideally targeted 
distribution of PWP income. An alternative and less convenient way of making sure that the 
unskilled labour employed by the public works programme is actually mapped to poor 
household is to treat it as a direct transfer. The results will be the same except that this short-
cut would by-pass GDP in the SAM and one would have to do some ex-post, and therefore 
less elegant, modelling in order to make sure that the labour income paid out by the public 
works programme is actually taken along in the  computation of GDP. A sensitivity analysis 
was performed around this issue by also allocating this income to the ‘regular’ unskilled 
labour category which means that it is distributed to a much wider range of households 
according to the existing patterns in the SAM.     20
imported intermediate purchases
38.   This approach is adequate for the purpose 
of modelling the impact of the EPWP, since this is not likely to fundamentally 
change the structure of the economy. 
7.2 Input data 
Labour and machine based infrastructure expenditure patterns were each applied 
to an overall budget of R3 billion, and the results of the two expenditure 
patterns evaluated.  The difference between the two expenditure patterns 
represents the impact of ex-ante budget neutral switching from machine to 
labour based infrastructure provision, as envisaged under the EPWP. 
The expenditure patterns of the two options was derived from information based 
on case studies in the Limpopo Province which also supplied the micro-
economic survey data in the previous section, drawing on actual expenditure 
from the Gundo Lashu public works programme, and quotations for the 
implementation of similar road reconstruction using conventional machine 
based methods, see table 2. 
The main differences are in the percentage of costs allocated to unskilled 
labour, plant and to a lesser degree fuel and transport.  As anticipated, a large 
proportion of the labour based budget is allocated to unskilled labour.  This 
labour, as explained above, is public works specific labour whose income is, 
unlike regular unskilled labour, assumed to be distributed only to the bottom 
20% of the income earning households. The machine based method allocates a 
large proportion of its expenditure on plant. The allocations to building 
materials are more or less the same for both scenarios, but fuels and transport 
costs are higher for the machine based option as this is linked to the use of 
                                                       
38 Input-output analysis assumes that there is sufficient capacity available in the backward 
linkages to satisfy the demand of the stimulus at hand and that prices will therefore remain 
constant. This may be true for most secondary and tertiary sectors, but not necessarily for 
primary sectors. It is possible that agriculture or mining will not expand their production to 
meet additional demand for its products that is related directly and indirectly to the stimulus. 
It may well be that those sectors will divert exports to an expanding domestic market. We 
will accommodate this by imposing supply side constraints on the multipliers. The values of 
supply constrained multipliers are usually lower than standard multipliers.  Note also that all 
government revenues from taxes, both direct and indirect, are collected at the national level 
and we ignore revenues of local and provincial governments apart from those directly related 
to the stimulus. We also ignore the revenues that provincial and possibly local governments 
obtain from inter provincial and other inter governmental transfers.  
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plant. Overheads and profits were the same for both methods.  More details on 
the expenditure pattern are presented in Appendix B. 
Table 2: Summary expenditure patterns for labour based and machine 
based infrastructure production (2003) 
   Labour Based Method  Machine Based Method 
1.  Overhead 3.6%  3.6% 
2.  Gain 7.2%  7.2% 
3.  Unskilled lab.  26.0%  7.6% 
4.  Skilled lab.  5.5%  6.8% 
5.  Plant 11.8%  22.8% 
6.  Fuels 8.7%  9.9% 
7.  Transport 0.3%  3.1% 
8.  Materials 26.8% 28.9% 
9.  Project design  10.0%  10.0% 
10.  Total   100.0%  100.0% 
Source:  Taylor et al (forthcoming). 
The expenditures of both public works options may be expressed in terms of the 
model variable ∆F, (see Appendix C for a detailed breakdown across all the 
variables).   Demand associated with the public works programs focuses on a 
limited number of commodities, including petroleum products, non metallic 
minerals, metal products, machinery, transport equipment and other services.  In 
addition, capital and labour also benefit directly.  Demand for all other 
commodities is initially not affected.  
Table 3: Allocation of expenditure to labour variables 













  %  %  R million  R million 
Public works labour  26.0%  7.6%  781  228 
Low skilled labour      0  0 
Skilled labour   5.5%  6.8%  166  205 
High skilled labour  10.0%  10.0%  300  300 
Source:  Taylor et al (forthcoming).   22
Given the budget constraint and the proportion of total expenditure allocated to 
unskilled labour, (26% of the budget of the labour based method and 8% of the 
machine based method), the number of workdays of labour that will be directly 
employed on site can be calculated, given a known daily wage rate.  This can 
also be calculated in terms of annual person year equivalents, see Table 4. 
Table 3 shows the percentage of a total budget of R3 billion, which would be 
allocated to labour in both the machine and labour based scenarios over a one 
year period, and also actual expenditure. The impact of this expenditure on 
sectoral output across the model is illustrated in Appendix C.  
Table 4: Direct impact on labour demand for labour based and machine 
based infrastructure provision (2003) 















1.  Ave EPWP wage rate per day  29.2  52.1  35.0 
2.  Days per month  21.67  21.67  21.67 
3.  Months per year  12  12  12 
4.  Ave EPWP wage rate (annual) 7,593  13,553  9,101 
5.  Ave med skilled wage rate ( SAM annual) 81,726  81,726  81,726 
6.  Ave hi skilled wage rate (SAM annual)  304,763 304,763 304,763 
7.  Project budget (Rm annual)  3000  3000  3000 
8.  Wage bill EPWP(unskilled) (Rm annual)  781  228  228 
9.  Wage bill med skilled (Rm annual)  166  205  205 
10. Wage bill hi skilled (Rm annual)  300  300  300 
11. Empl EPWP (unskilled) (annual)  102,836  16,834  25,068 
12. Empl med skilled (annual) 2,027  2,513  2,513 
13. Empl hi skilled (annual)  984  984  984 
Source: Taylor et al, forthcoming. 
Note: Wage derived from Gundo Lashu public works programme wage. 
Assumed average wage rates are indicated in row 1, the number of working 
days per month in row 2 (including on the job training courses taking place 
during the days employed), and an annual equivalent wage in row 3 (calculated 
on the basis of the daily wage).  The same information is represented for the 
other two skill categories, using industry average wage rates for the construction   23
industry as reported in the SAM data base and updated with the wage deflator 
from the SA Reserve Bank
39.  Rows 5-6 indicate that medium skilled labour was 
estimated to earn around R81 000 per year and highly skilled labour in the 
construction sector (engineers etc) took on average home (before tax) more than 
R300 000 per year in 2003. 
Given the budget constraint of R3 billion (as shown in row 7) and the 
expenditure patterns from the case study, the total wage bill for each labour 
category can be calculated (rows 8-10 of Table 4). Division of the wage bill by 
the average wage rate provides an estimate of the direct demand for labour by 
the project, see rows 11–13.  In the machine based option between 4.5 and 6.6 
million unskilled workdays would be required directly on site per annum, 
(between 17,000 and 25,000 full time jobs), depending on the average wage rate 
assumed.  The lower the average wage rate, the more workers can be hired 
within the budget constraint.  By contrast, in the labour based option 27 million 
unskilled workdays were required per annum, approximately 103,000 full time 
jobs.  This represents 309,000 temporary 4 month job opportunities, or 206,000 
temporary 6 month job opportunities
40 
7.3 The Model Results 
The direct and indirect impact of both methods of infrastructure provision on 
the economy is calculated using the SAM.  By taking the difference between the 
results of the two methods we arrive at the impact of budget neutral switching 
from machine to labour based methods of infrastructure production on output.  
The impact on the food processing sector is estimated at about R150 million
41, 
while other industries that benefit from the switch to labour based methods are 
beverages, trade and electricity. There are also a number of industries that will 
see their gross value of output decline including petroleum refineries, 
machinery, iron & steel and non metallic minerals. These industries are more 
prominent in the machine based method and tend to lose out with a switch to 
labour based methods. The full set of results for all sectors is included in 
Appendix D.  
                                                       
39 Using Reserve Bank Series 7012 and a log linear estimate for the year 2003. 
40 While the number of workdays created is objective, the actual number of workers 
employed as a consequence is dependent on political and management factors. 
41 For example in Appendix D, row 1 indicates that while the direct impact on output (gross 
value of production) of food processing is zero, due to income expenditure by the project, 
output of the food processing sector is expected to rise by R450 million in the labour based 
scenario compared to R300 million in the machine based scenario.   24
Table 5: Direct and indirect impact on factors of production, labour 
demand and growth for labour and machine based infrastructure 
provision (2003). 
































1 CAP  216  216  1,386  1,345  41 
2  LABEPWP  781 228 781 228 553 
3 LABLowSkill  0  0  236  229  7 
4  LABMedSkill  166 205 592 622 -30 
5  LABHiSkill  300 300 621 610  12 
6  Gross sectoral output  809  1,039  4,848  4,679  169 
7 Output  multiplier      1.6  1.5   
8 GDP  1,462  950  3,615  3,033  583 
9 GDP  multiplier      1.2  1.0   
10  % of GDP  0.1%  0.1%  0.34%  0.28%  0.05% 
11 Government  inc  345  389  1,039  1,021  19 
12 Imports  268  425  1,452  1,488  -36 
13  % Ch in 0-20%  3.1%  0.9%  3.2%  1.0%  2.1% 
14  % Ch in 20-50%  1.1%  0.3%  1.2%  0.5%  0.8% 
15  % Ch in 50-90%  0.0%  0.0%  0.2%  0.2%  0.0% 
16  % Ch in 90-100%  0.0%  0.0%  0.2%  0.2%  0.0% 
17  Employment EPWP (full 
time jobs p/a) 
104,384 25,543 104,384 25,543  77,767 
18   Low skilled  0  0  3,123  2,769  353 
19   Medium skilled  2,027  2,513  8,456  8,288  168 
20   High skilled  984  984  3,435  3,177  258 
21    Total  105,847 28,565 117,850 39,303  78,547 
Source: Own calculations. 
The impacts in terms of labour demand and growth are set out in Table 5.  The 
direct impact is shown in the first two columns, and the total (direct plus 
indirect) impact in columns 3 and 4.   The impact of shifting from machine 
based to labour based infrastructure provision is shown in column 5.  In terms 
of factors of production, rows 1 to 5 apply.  The production factor capital is 
expected to gain substantially from expenditure on infrastructure provision, but 
there is very little difference between a labour based and a machine based 
approach. Row 2 indicates that there is only a direct impact on public works   25
labour, ie, there are no indirect or knock-on effects on this type of labour. The 
reason is that by assumption no other sector in the South African economy 
employs this type of labour. The difference of R550 million between the two 
options (see last entry of the row) represents the impact of switching from 
machine to labour based methods. Other ‘regular’ unskilled labour and indeed 
to a larger degree the other skill categories (rows 3-5) will benefit upstream 
from the expenditure on infrastructure, although as with capital, there is very 
little difference between the two options. The most striking observation can be 
made for medium skilled labour which benefited more from the machine based 
than the labour based option. 
7.4 GDP Effect  
A summary of the impact on sectoral output and GDP is provided in rows 6-10 
of table 5.  The direct contribution to GDP is relatively high in the labour based 
method, as a large proportion of project expenditure is on labour, which feeds 
directly into GDP (here measured at factor costs). The direct and indirect impact 
of the labour based option is about 0.1% (rounded) higher than the impact of the 
machine based approach.  When taking the indirect contribution into account, 
the difference between the two options is about R600 million worth of value 
added, very similar to the difference if only direct impacts are considered. This 
suggests that the final (direct and indirect) impact on GDP is mainly driven by 
the direct effects. In short, the impact on GDP of shifting from machine based to 
labour based methods, represents 0.1% of total GDP, as measured for the year 
2003
42.  
Given the initial expenditure of R3 billion, the output multiplier is estimated at 
1.6 in the labour based and 1.5 in the machine based option while the GDP 
multipliers are 1.2 and 1.0 respectively
43.  In terms of GDP, the labour based 
option therefore adds 20% to the initial expenditure while the machine based 
option returns the same initial amount of R3 billion.  The impact of shifting 
from machine to labour based technologies is worth about 0.1% of GDP for 
every R 3 billion spent. Growth in GDP was measured at 1.9% during 2003. 
With the addition in GDP due to the shifting from capital to labour intensity as 
                                                       
42 2003 GDP at factor costs is estimated by taking 2002 GDP and applying an estimated 8% 
(2% real growth and 6% deflator) nominal growth rate 
43 These multipliers are typically lower than the conventional (unconstrained supply) 
multipliers which are around 2.1 and 1.0 for the labour based and machine based output 
multipliers respectively and 1.4 and 1.2 for the labour based and machined base GDP 
multipliers respectively. This suggests that the supply constraint is quite important, taking 
about 30% off the output effect and about 20% off the impact on GDP.   26
estimated in the last entry of row 47, GDP growth would have been 0.06% 
higher. 
It would therefore appear that the impact of a budget neutral switching from 
machine to labour based infrastructure provision to the tune of R3 billion has a 
very small but perceptible positive impact on GDP.  The reason is that the 
labour based option is less import intensive as the machine based option so that 
there are less leakages out of the demand side system. The linear nature of our 
model makes it easy to evaluate the size of the public works programmes in 
order to make switching more noticeable in terms of GDP.  A R10 billion 
program of infrastructure expenditure, would, given the multipliers outlined in 
the previous table yield an increase in GDP of about 1%. Switching between the 
two options is however, still limited to about 0.2% of GDP. A switch of R60 
billion from capital to labour intensive infrastructure provision would be 
required to a sizeable (1%) impact on GDP.  
7.5 Government Income Effect 
The impact on government income is shown in row 11 of table 5. The initial 
budget neutrality is not maintained, as government revenues increase slightly 
when shifting from a machine to a labour based scenario. The reason is that 
with slightly higher economic activity (see last entry of row 8) more direct and 
indirect taxes are raised. The direct impact is derived from the expenditure 
patterns of the two options and mainly involves commodity and import taxes. 
The latter makes the machine based option more attractive given the higher 
import content, which is confirmed in the next row in where it can be seen that 
the import content of the machine based option is indeed higher, although the 
difference is reduced when indirect effects are accounted for. The lower 
difference in direct and indirect imports between the two options can be 
explained by the knock-on multiplier effects of the labour based option, which 
in terms of value of output, are much higher, as shown above, thereby pulling in 
more imports, even if the import content of the indirect effects is more or less 
the same. As a result, the direct and indirect impact on imports of shifting from 
machine based to labour based production of infrastructure is relatively small, 
with imports falling by R36 million.     27
7.6 Household Income Effect 
In terms of household income, the impact is expressed in terms of percentage 
change from the base
44. In the first two columns the direct impact on household 
income is shown.  Poor households, here defined as the bottom 20% of the 
income earning households, would benefit most, particularly in the labour based 
scenario, if employment were explicitly and successfully targeted to this group. 
Machine based infrastructure is also beneficial for the poor due to the scale of 
expenditure, but not as much as labour based. The direct plus indirect impact on 
the bottom 20% is larger than the impact of labour income of workers employed 
on site only. This means that poor households will also benefit from labour 
income from the other skill categories and capital income identified in the 
expenditure patterns of the programme, which follows from the income 
distribution patterns embedded in the underlying SAM. The direct impact of the 
labour based option on the household income of the poorest quintile is 3.1%, 
and the upstream knock-on multiplier effect adds another 0.1%, thereby raising 
it by 3.2%.  Nevertheless, the impact on household income is mainly driven by 
the direct effect. The multiplier knock-on effects are very modest.  Under the 
machine based scenario the total impact is only 1.0%, hence shifting from 
machine to labour based technology has a substantial positive impact on poor 
households (the bottom quintile), raising their income by more than 2% but this 
is mainly driven by the direct effect
45. Other household income groups identified 
in Table 5 also benefit from the shift in labour intensity, but the impact is 
extremely limited. 
However, the analysis above attempts to model a successfully poverty targeted 
EPWP whereby public works employment was distributed to the lowest quintile 
only.  It may not be assumed that this level of success in poverty targeting will 
take place, and a sensitivity analysis was carried out around the earning of wage 
income by unskilled labour to explore the implications of this assumption.  In 
the analysis above the special unskilled labour category was used to simulate 
poverty targeting.  This may be compared with the outcome when public works 
wage income is allocated according to the conventional SAM distribution of 
‘regular’ unskilled labour, which distributes income to a much wider range of 
households. Under this scenario the impact on GDP (not shown in the table) is 
negligible but the benefits are much wider spread among the rich and poor, with 
the largest increase being recorded by the 20-50% income class, and the 50-
90% income class benefiting to the same degree as the bottom 20%. This 
                                                       
44 Using the same factoring-up of the 2000 SAM base to the year 2003 as described above. 
45 This was calculated by dividing the R560 million increase in income of the bottom quintile 
by the total income of these households, which is estimated to be around R26 billion in (2003 
prices).   28
suggests that without targeting the impact is much more defused and the impact 
on the poor less significant. 
7.7 The Impact on the Demand for Labour  
The impact on the demand for labour, like the monetary effects discussed 
above, only applies for as long as the expenditures take place; the ‘jobs’ created 
are not permanent positions but rather ‘temporary employment opportunities’.  
The effects are measured in full time person year equivalents but can easily be 
converted to workdays using the conversion factors shown in rows 2 and 3 of 
Table 4.  Demand for labour from the special employment category ‘public 
works labour’ does not benefit from upstream multiplier effects, as it is solely 
linked to the project. The difference between the labour based and machine 
based option is about 78 000 person year equivalents (see row 17). Row 18 
suggests that other low skilled labour will benefit, although not directly (see 
first two entries) through similar levels of upstream multiplier effects in both 
options, with 3 000 person year equivalents in the labour based option and about 
2 700 person year equivalents in the machine based option. The impact of 
shifting factor intensity is therefore about 350 person year equivalents.   
Similarly, the impact of shifting is 170 and 260 person year equivalents for 
medium and high skilled labour respectively.  In short, shifting from machine 
based to labour based public works technologies is expected to generate a few 
hundred person year equivalents in the regular labour categories. This is due to 
the upstream multiplier effects of labour based public works expenditure, which 
tends to be more labour intensive, but the impact is not significant, comprising 
less than 1% of the total employment created.  In total, i.e., accounting for the 
direct as well as indirect effects (see row 21), the impact on employment of 
shifting from machine to labour based infrastructure provision for a R3 billion 
budget is about 1%, i.e., 79 000 person year equivalents out of about 8 million 
workers currently employed in South Africa. 
The machine based employment results in Table 5 are based on a daily wage 
rate of R35, the reported wage in the industry (see Table 4). If the daily wage 
rate is raised to R52 (the industry minimum wage) in the machine based option 
the number of workdays for the machine based option drops by 8 000 person 
year equivalents. Since the same total value of labour income is paid out to the 
same target households, no other changes take place in the model. In this 
instance shifting from a machine based option which employs less labour 
initially (at R52), to a labour based option employing workers at R29.2 (as in 
Table 4) will therefore add to the 79 000 already calculated another 8 000   29
person year equivalents, a further 0.1% of the 8 million workers currently 
employed in South Africa, representing a total increase in employment of 1.1%.  
Finally, we mentioned earlier that we were using marginal employment output 
relationships as a more realistic way to compute the knock-on employment 
effects compared to using the traditional average employment output 
relationship. The question can be raised what the difference between these two 
assumption is, in terms of our application. Firstly, note that the difference 
between marginal and average employment output relationships only applies to 
the knock-on effects. The bulk of the impact of switching from machine based 
to labour based public works technology relates to directly employed workers 
and is therefore not affected by the difference in the marginal - average 
employment output assumption. The latter therefore only applies to the indirect 
employment impacts which, as we had noted above, is about 1% of the total 
employment created by the shift. As it turns out, indirect unskilled labour is 
about 2.9 times higher using average employment – output ratios which yields 
about 1 000 person year equivalents instead of the 350 reported in the last entry 
of row 18 of Table 5 above. Similarly, the factors are 2.4 and 1.4 for medium 
and high skilled labour taking them to 400 and 350 instead of 170 and 260 as 
reported in rows 19 and 20 of Table 5 respectively. The total impact on indirect 
employment, across all labour categories, is then 1 800 instead of 800 person 
year equivalents. In summary, the difference in assumptions about the 
relationship between employment and output represents therefore about 1 000 
person year equivalents.  
7.8 Summary of Macroeconomic Impact  
Overall the impact on GDP of shifting from machine to labour based methods is 
0.1% of total GDP, as measured for the year 2003, which is mainly driven by 
the direct effects. The direct impact on government income mainly involves 
commodity and import taxes, with import taxes making the machine based 
option more attractive given the higher import content.  The difference is 
reduced when indirect effects are considered, due to the higher knock-on 
multiplier effects of the labour based option, which pulls in more imports, even 
though the import content of these indirect effects is similar. As a result, the 
total impact on imports of switching from machine to labour based options is 
relatively small.  Industries benefiting from the budget neutral switching to 
labour based methods are beverages, trade and electricity, with the impact on 
output of the food processing sector standing at R150 million.  A number of 
industries will suffer as a consequence of the shift, including petroleum 
refineries, machinery, iron & steel and non metallic minerals.      30
As would be anticipated, poor households, the bottom 20% of income earning 
households, benefit most if employment is targeted to them; if successfully 
targeted, shifting from machine to labour based technology has a substantial 
positive impact on the poor, raising their income by 2%. The impact on 
household income is mainly driven by the direct effect as the multiplier effects 
are modest. Other household income groups also benefit but the impact is 
limited.  If employment is allocated to ‘regular’ unskilled labour, as suggested 
by the microeconomic study rather than the poorest quintile, the impact on GDP 
(not shown in the table) is negligible but the benefits are much wider spread, 
with the largest increase recorded by the 20-50% income class, while even the 
50-90% income class benefits to the same degree as the bottom 20%. This 
suggests that in this case the impact is much more defused. 
In terms of labour demand, the difference between the labour and capital based 
options is estimated to be about 80 000 person year equivalents (or 20 million 
workdays), with a few hundred additional person year equivalents in the other 
skill categories. The upstream multiplier effects of labour based public works 
expenditure are more labour intensive as the composition of output shifts 
towards activities that employ more labour per unit of output.  In sum, the 
impact on national employment can be estimated at about 1%, or 80 000 person 
year equivalents out of about 8 million workers currently employed in South 
Africa. 
8. Conclusion 
At the microeconomic level, survey data suggests that the income poverty 
reduction impact of short-term PWP employment will be limited, although the 
poverty gap (depth of poverty) experienced by participating households is 
temporarily reduced.  The implication is that a short-term employment 
opportunity is not likely to have significant insurance benefit function in the 
context of chronic ongoing unemployment, and hence is unlikely to facilitate a 
sustained movement out of poverty. 
Some improvement in the material and financial asset base of participating 
households was indicated by the survey findings, but only limited investment in 
formal or informal income generating activity, and a limited stimulus to the 
local economy.  These benefits are likely to be limited to the period of PWP 
implementation.  The survey data also suggest that the labour market effect of 
programme participation, mediated though improved labour skills and 
experience, will be limited in the context of mass unemployment, given the 
critical challenge is the structural and mass nature of unemployment.  Targeting   31
a poorer group for PWP employment, and extending programme duration would 
be likely to maximise the impact of the intervention.  
Likewise the survey data findings suggested that the labour market benefits of 
the programme may only be temporary in nature, and were unlikely to promote 
significant secondary economic activity or employment, given the mass nature 
of unemployment and the limited demand for un- or semi-skilled workers on the 
one hand, and the lack of access to capital on the other, constraining both formal 
and informal sector labour demand activity. 
These findings conform with the concern outlined above; that the nature of the 
policy prescription is inconsistent with the nature of the labour market problem, 
and hence unlikely to meet the policy objectives of making significant impacts 
on poverty and unemployment.   
The macroeconomic analysis further supports this contention, indicating that an 
annual shift in the factor intensity of R3 billion of existing infrastructure budget 
allocations is unlikely to have a significant impact at macro level on 
employment or GDP growth, largely due to the limited scale of the intervention.  
The impact on poverty would be contingent on targeting of PWP employment to 
the poorest quintile, in which case it could increase income in the aggregate by 
2%, but if employment were spread across unskilled labour more generally, as 
indicated in the survey findings, the impact on the poor would cease to be 
significant.  
Hence the micro and macro analysis suggests that a programme such as the 
EPWP could be expected to make a temporary contribution to poverty 
alleviation, but not to offer a significant response at micro or macro level to 
poverty, unemployment or growth, as the policy instrument selected is 
inappropriate given the structural and chronic nature of the labour market 
problem in South Africa, and its scale too limited.   
While these conclusions are derived from South African data, they serve to 
illustrate a more widespread problem within social protection policy 
internationally; an analytical conflation of acute and chronic labour market 
crises, which leads to the adoption of short-term public works interventions as a 
central response to transient and structural labour market crises alike.  Given the 
limited risk insurance function of a short-term public works programme in the 
context of chronic unemployment, and the limited benefits of shifting the factor 
intensity of a small portion of the national budget, it is unlikely that the 
adoption of such policies will be significant in terms of addressing poverty, 
labour market or growth objectives.    32
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Disaggregation of a 2000 SAM for South Africa 
A1: Commodities and activities 
      Commodities / activities  Abrev        Commodities / activities  Abrev 
1  11-13  Agriculture, forestry & fishing  AGRI  23 353-355 
Metal products excluding 
machinery  METP 
2  21  Coal  mining  COAL  24 356-359 Machinery  &  equipment  MACH 
3  23  Gold & uranium ore mining  GOLD  25  361-366  Electrical machinery  ELMA 
4  22, 24, 25, 29  Other mining  OTHM  26 371-373 
TV, radio & communication 
equipm  COME 
5 301-304  Food  FOOD  27 374-376 
Professional & scientific 
equipment  SCIE 
6  305-306  Beverages & tobacco  BEVT  28 381-383 
Motor vehicles, parts & 
accessories  VEHI 
7  311-312  Textiles  TEXT  29 384-387 Other transport equipment  TRNE 
8 313-315  Wearing  apparel  APPA 30  391  Furniture  FURN 
9  316  Leather & leather products  LEAT 31  392  Other  industries  OTHI 
10 317  Footwear  FOOT  32 41  Electricity,  gas  &  steam  ELEG 
11  321-322  Wood & wood products  WOOD 33 42  Water  supply  WATR 
12  323  Paper & paper products  PAPR  34  51  Building construction  CONS 
13 324-326 
Printing, publishing & record 
media  PRNT  35 52-53 
Civil engineering & other 
construct  TRAD 
14  331-333  Coke & refined petroleum prods  PETR  36  61-62  Wholesale & retail trade  HCAT 
15 334  Basic  chemicals  BCHM  37 63 
Catering & accommodation 
services  TRAN 
16 335-336 
Other chemicals & man-made 
fibres  OCHM  38 71  Transport  &  storage  COMM 
17 337  Rubber  products  RUBB  39 72  Communication  FINS 
18  338  Plastic products  PLAS  40  81-82  Finance & insurance  BUSS 
19  341  Glass & glass products  GLAS 41  83  Business  services  MAOS 
20 342  Non-metallic  minerals  NMMP 42 93-98  Medical and other services  OTHP 
21  351  Basic iron & steel  IRON  43  99  Other  GOVS 
22  352  Basic non-ferrous metals  NFRM         
 
A2: Labour categories 
   Description 
Professional, semi-professional and technical occupations 
Managerial, executive and administrative occupations 
Highly skilled 
  
   Certain transport occupations, e.g. pilot navigator 
Clerical occupations 
Sales occupations 
Transport, delivery and communications occupations 
Service occupations 
Farmer, farm manager 







   Production foreman, production supervisor 
Semi- and unskilled  The rest 
   37
A3: Household income classes 
   % of income earned 
d0 0%  -  10% 
d1 10%  -  20.0% 
d2 20%  -  30.0% 
d3 30%  -  40.0% 
d4 40%  -  50.0% 
d5 50%  -  60.0% 
d6 60%  -  70.0% 
d7 70%  -  80.0% 
d8 80%  -  90.0% 
d91 90%  -  95.0% 
d921 95% -  96.25% 
d922 96% -  97.50% 
d923 98% -  98.75% 
d924 99% -  100.00% 
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 Appendix B: Allocation of detailed expenditure patterns to model variables (2003)
46 





Share of total 
SAM 
classification 
Overhead 3.6%  3.6%  Other  services 
Gain 7.2%  7.2%  Capital 
Subtotal 10.8%  10.8%   
Labour      
Unskilled lab.  26.0%  7.6%  Low skilled 
Skilled lab.  5.5%  6.8%  Med skilled 
Subtotal 31.5%  14.5%   
Plant      
Tipper Trucks  5.5%  4.7%  Other trnsp 
Heavy Plant  0.0%  9.8%  Machinery 
Compaction Plant  3.3%  5.5%  Machinery 
Small Plant  3.1%  2.8%  Machinery 
Subtotal 11.8%  22.8%   
Fuel      
Diesel 8.7%  9.9%  Petrol  refineries 
Subtotal 8.7%  9.9%   
Transport      
Transport 3.1%  0.3%  Transport  serv 
Subtotal 3.1%  0.3%   
Materials      
Road signs  0.4%  0.4%  Metal products 
Pre-cast concrete units  7.4%  7.9%  Non-met mins 
Cement 0.5%  0.5%  Non-met  mins 
Concrete aggregated  0.8%  0.8%  Non-met mins 
Bituminous materials  17.8%  19.2%  Petrol refineries 
Subtotal 26.8%  28.9%   
Project design      
Wages 10.0%  10.0%  Highly  skilled 
Subtotal 10.0%  10.0%   
Source: I.T. Transport Limited. 
                                                       
46 Detailed expenditures are allocated to model variables, as can be seen in the last column of 
the table. In row 1 expenditure on overheads is allocated to other services in the model, while 
gain is appropriated by the  production factor capital as can be seen in row 2.  
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Appendix C: Direct impact on commodity demand for labour based and machine 
based infrastructure provision (2003) 









  %  %  R million  R million 
CAGRI     0  0 
CCOAL     0  0 
CGOLD     0  0 
COTHM     0  0 
CFOOD     0  0 
CBEVT     0  0 
CTEXT     0  0 
CAPPA     0  0 
CLEAT     0  0 
CFOOT     0  0 
CWOOD     0  0 
CPAPR     0  0 
CPRNT     0  0 
CPETR 26.5%  29.1%  795  873 
CBCHM     0  0 
COCHM     0  0 
CRUBB     0  0 
CPLAS     0  0 
CGLAS     0  0 
CNMMP 8.6%  9.3%  259  279 
CIRON     0  0 
CNFRM     0  0 
CMETP 0.4%  0.4%  11  12 
CMACH 6.4%  18.2%  191  545 
CELMA     0  0 
CCOME     0  0 
CSCIE     0  0 
CVEHI     0  0 
CTRNE 5.5%  4.7%  164  140 
CFURN     0  0 
COTHI     0  0 
CELEG     0  0 
CWATR     0  0 
CCONS 0.0%  0.0%  0  0 
CTRAD     0  0 
CHCAT     0  0 
CTRAN 0.3%  3.1%  10  94 
CCOMM     0  0 
CFINS 0.0%  0.0%  0  0 
CBUSS     0  0 
CMAOS 3.6%  3.6%  108  108 
COTHP     0  0 
CGOVS     0  0 
CAP 7.2%  7.2%  216  216 
LABEPWP 26.0%  7.6%  781  228 
LABLS     0  0 
LABSK 5.5%  6.8%  166  205 
LABHI 10.0%  10.0%  300  300 
Total 100.0%  100.0%  3,000  3,000 
Source: I.T. Transport Limited and own calculations, Note: abbreviations are explained in full in Appendix A.  40
Appendix D: Direct and indirect impact on commodity demand for labour based and 
machine based infrastructure provision (2003) 









Impact of switching 
from machine to 
labour based 
 
Direct impact  Direct impact  Total impact  Total impact  R million 
AFOOD 0  0  451  300  151 
ABEVT 0  0  201  134  68 
ATEXT 0  0  37  32  6 
AAPPA 0  0  34  27  8 
ALEAT  0 0 4 3 1 
AFOOT 0  0  13  10  3 
AWOOD 1  1  17  16  1 
APAPR 0  0  76  70  6 
APRNT 0  0  44  42  3 
APETR  378 415 498 534 -37 
ABCHM  12 13 80 77  3 
AOCHM 1  1  105  91  14 
ARUBB 0  0  14  14  -1 
APLAS 0  1  30  28  2 
AGLAS  0 0 8 7 1 
ANMMP  188 202 215 231 -16 
AIRON 1  1  55  73  -18 
ANFRM 0  0  25  30  -5 
AMETP  13 21 54 67 -13 
AMACH  57 159 89 196  -108 
AELMA 0  0  20  22  -2 
ACOME  0 0 6 6 0 
ASCIE  0 0 4 4 0 
AVEHI 4  7  97  102  -4 
ATRNE  46 39 54 47  7 
AFURN 0  0  17  15  2 
AOTHI 0  0  15  14  1 
AELEG 0  0  126  102  24 
AWATR 0  0  46  37  9 
ACONS 0  0  32  30  2 
ATRAD 0  0  768  717  51 
AHCAT 0  0  69  65  4 
ATRAN 8  78  301  360  -60 
ACOMM 0  0  168  153  15 
AFINS 0  0  387  368  19 
ABUSS 0  0  332  321  11 
AMAOS  100 100 197 187  11 
AOTHP 0  0  144  133  10 
AGOVS 0  0  12  11  1 
CAP 216  216  1,386  1,345  41 
LABEPWP  781 228 781 228 553 
LABLS 0  0  236  229  7 
LABSK  166 205 592 622 -30 
LABHI  300 300 621 610  12 
Gross sectoral output  809  1,039  4,848  4,679  169 
Output  multiplier     1.6  1.6  
GDP  1,462 950 3,615  3,033 583 
GDP  multiplier     1.2  1.0  
% of GDP  0.1%  0.1%  0.34%  0.28%  0.05% 
Government inc  345  389  1,039  1,021  19 
Imports 268  425  1,452  1,488  -36 
% Ch in 0-20%  3.1%  0.9%  3.2%  1.0%  2.1% 
% Ch in 20-50%  1.1%  0.3%  1.2%  0.5%  0.8% 
% Ch in 50-90%  0.0%  0.0%  0.2%  0.2%  0.0% 
% Ch in 90-100%  0.0%  0.0%  0.2%  0.2%  0.0% 
Employment EPWP (full time jobs p/a)  104,384  25,543  104,384  25,543  77,767 
                     Low skilled  0  0  3,123  2,769  353 
                     Medium skilled  2,027 2,513 8,456 8,288  168 
                     High skilled  984  984  3,435  3,177  258 
                     Total  105,847  28,565  117,850  39,303  78,547 
Source: own calculations. 
Note that output results are not given for the first 4 industries because they are supply constrained. Given this constraint, these sectors will 
record a decline in final demand, so as to satisfy intermediate demand emanating from the exogenous shocks. The decline in final demand 
may be achieved by lower exports or by lower household demand. These results are not reported in this analysis. The Centre for Social Science Research 
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The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:  
 
The Aids and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports quantitative 
and qualitative research into the social and economic impact of 
the HIV pandemic in Southern Africa.  Focus areas include:  the 
economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 